THE INTERNATIONAL LEASE AS A LEGAL
INSTRUMENT OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE
SHAB'A FARMS AS A PROTOTYPE FOR THE
RESOLUTION OF TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS
Noemi Gal-Or*and Michael J. StraussI. THE SHAB'A FARMS .......................................
II. THE NATURE OF TERRITORIAL LEASES .......................
Ill. THE POTENTIAL OF LEASING THE SHAB'A FARMS ..............

535
537
538

The Shab'a Farms have been considered the linchpin in the Hizb' Allah
rhetoric to destabilize the Israel-Lebanon-Syria relationship. We contemplate
here the possibility of defusing the conflict over the territory by using a lease
as a public international legal device.
I. THE SHAB'A FARMS
The Shab'a Farms area comprises six now-abandoned farmlands, on forty
square kilometres where Syria, Lebanon and Israel converge.' Until 1967, it
was considered Syrian. Israel seized it during the 1967 Six-Day War and still
occupies it as captured Syrian territory. In April 2007, Lebanon advised the
United Nations (UN) that it considered the Shab'a Farms to be Lebanese.2 The
so-called Second Lebanon War in 2006 resulted from the Hizb' Allah's
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incursion into Israeli territory under the claim that the Shab'a Farms was
Lebanese territory occupied by Israel, to be liberated by the Hizb' Allah. The
UN Secretary General noted after the war that
[T]he issue of the Shab'a Farms area continues to be put forward-in
contradiction to the repeated resolutions of the Security Council-to
justify the existence and activities of Hizbollah insofar as militant
activity across the Blue Line is concerned.... A permanent solution
of this issue [regarding status of the area], however, remains
contingent upon the delineation of the border between the Syrian
Arab Republic and Lebanon.3
The major pertinent legal issue consists of defining the border and
sovereign jurisdiction in the disputed area. UN efforts in addressing this have
intensified since the 2006 war. Meanwhile, the Secretary-General has referred
to repeated Syrian statements that the farmlands were Lebanese as "a new legal
reality,"4 although the UN still considers the territory Syrian. He has also
acknowledged an option suggested by Lebanon to temporarily place the
farmlands under UN jurisdiction.5
The dispute thus takes the following shape: Israel claims that Syria has
title, while Lebanon and Syria claim that Lebanon has title. The UN supports
the Israeli claim. And the only state claiming title for itself, Lebanon, has never
exercised effective control over the Shab'a Farms, and has suggested assigning
it to the party backing the competing claim-the UN.
The difficulty in settling this dispute by traditional diplomacy argues in
favor of applying other means. One that may hold promise is territorial leasing,
which allows a state to exercise control over an area where it does not have
sovereignty, by allocating sovereign rights to more than one state or party.
Leasing injects two elements into resolving sovereignty disputes that are
not traditionally present: first, a lease between states has the aura and connotations of a private law contract, creating broader options for dealing with a
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territorial issue.6 Second, "the competences gained by one state on another's
territory through a lease may satisfy objectives that otherwise could only be
achieved by obtaining sovereignty over the territory itself."7 This transforms
the conflict from one about sovereignty to one about specific components of
sovereignty--competences and rights-and opens alternative paths to settling
it.8 The cooperation required after creating a lease can then foster confidencebuilding.
II. THE NATURE OF TERRITORIAL LEASES

Most territorial leases have economic, military, administrative or diplomatic objectives, 9 and states have shown great flexibility with their terms
governing duration and compensation. Only rarely have leases been used to
resolve territorial conflicts-between France and Spain (1856), Bangladesh and
India (1974/1992), Israel and Jordan (1994), and Ecuador and Peru (1998)and these had never been examined as a phenomenon until recently."0
A comparative study of the first three leases" showed they all resolved the
specific territorial problem they were created to address. They produced stable
situations of sovereignty, precise and respected boundaries, and an end to
violence where it occurred. All three leases generated new problems, but these
were either resolved or less acute than the initial ones and stemmed from
factors external to the agreements' form as a lease.
If territorial leases can succeed in this application, why are they so
infrequent? It appears the precedents, known only poorly and individually,
have gone undetected, as evidenced by attestations of the originality of using
a lease each time one was employed to resolve a territorial conflict. Creativity
has been necessary to arrive at this option.
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III. THE POTENTIAL OF LEASING THE SHAB'A FARMS

Besides Lebanon's suggestion to place the Shab'a Farms under UN
jurisdiction pending a permanent delineation ofthe boundary, Kaufman designs
two other scenarios-a "procedure of negotiation" to first settle the dispute,
after which, Israel (as occupier) would facilitate the demarcation of the border;
and an agreement on a "mechanism of resolution" among the three parties,
perhaps through international arbitration. 2 Yet agreement on the means would
still require the border's demarcation to be addressed. Without an agreement
between Syria and Lebanon to facilitate this, Lebanon would need to prove its
historic rights over the Shab'a Farms by demonstrating that it exercised
sovereignty there until 1967, against existing evidence. 3
Our proposal suggests embarking on a different route, tied to a recognized
need for all sides to maintain their dignity. 4
The conflicts that were resolved through territorial leases involve small
areas with few if any inhabitants, limited natural resources and limited
economic activity. These conditions are present in the Shab'a Farms, where the
reduced intensity of the dispute since the 2006 cease-fire may create an opening
for a lease to be discussed. Among the potential scenarios:
1)
2)
3)
4)

Confirmation of Syria's title to the Shab'a Farms, with Syria
leasing the territory to Lebanon;
Confirmation of Lebanon's title to the Shab'a Farms, with
Lebanon leasing the territory to Syria through an agreement that
formally recognizes Lebanese sovereignty over it;
Confirmation of Syria's title to the Shab'a Farms, with Syria
leasing the territory to Israel and transforming the occupation
into a more benign presence; and
Confirmation of either Syria's title or Lebanon's title to the
Shab'a Farms, with the sovereign state granting a lease to a nonstate actor-the UN, or even Hizb' Allah, which cannot be ruled
out in view of its relations with the other actors.

Instead of attempting an immediate settlement on final borderlines, we suggest
an international lease agreement as an interim solution with long-term
potential. 5
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